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Negotiation as a disagreement management tool 
 
Diego Castro 
Department of Theoretical Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy 





When people encounter a disagreement, they can do many things to overcome it. 
Among other strategies, they can argue to persuade the counterpart, call an arbitrator 
or mediator, toss a coin, or look for a compromise. In the last case they are using 
negotiation as a way out of their disagreement. Consider the following example: 
Example 1: Dinner night 
 
Jack and Leyla want to go to a restaurant but disagree on whether to pick 
“The Rose Garden” or “Chez Martin”. To overcome the disagreement, they 
can: 
1.A Argue that one of the restaurants is a better choice than the other 
(because of food quality, price, location, etc). 
1.B Offer a compromise, such as: “We’ll go to ‘Chez Martin’ this time, and to 
‘The Rose Garden’ next time” or “I will invite you if we go to ‘The Rose 
Garden’”. 
 
In the example the parties can choose between providing persuasive reasons (1.A) or 
negotiating (1.B). In the first case they are using a persuasion dialogue, in the second 
case a negotiation dialogue (Walton & Krabbe, 1995). They can also do both: start with 
1.A and then shift the dialogue to 1.B; or use a mixed dialogue type. 
Negotiation has usually been conceived as type of dialogue where the parties bargain 
their interests to get the best for themselves (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Ihnen Jory, 
2016; Walton, 1998; Wells & Reed, 2003). Under that conception, negotiation has to do 
with a difference of interests, rather than a difference of opinion. Therefore, the parties 
do not aim at arriving at a true answer but at settling the disagreement in the best way 
possible for them. 
However, as some authors claims ( Sycara, 1990; Provis, 2004; van Laar & Krabbe, 2018), 
negotiation and persuasion are deeply intertwined. So along with negotiations that are 
pure bargaining, negotiation can also be used to overcome differences of opinion. In 
order to do that the parties must change the dialogue type from persuasion to 
negotiation in what has been called the shift to negotiation (Van Laar & Krabbe, 2018). 
In this paper I will further develop and specify Van Laar and Krabbe´s idea that 
negotiations can be used to overcome1 differences of opinion through the shift to 
negotiation. Specifically, I will use the more generic term “disagreement” to ask two 
questions: first, what kind of disagreements can be negotiated? Second, how does 
negotiation as a disagreement management tool works, and how is it different from 
persuasion? 
To answer the first question, I will argue that disagreements can be shifted to 
negotiation given two conditions: (a) the disagreement must be practical rather than 
theoretical, and (b) the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice in order to arrive at a 
compromise, more specifically, they must be willing to sacrifice their epistemic goal in 
favor of their social goal (Jacobs, 2003). 
Then, I will specify how negotiation works in this context and what is its relation to 
persuasion. I will claim that negotiation of disagreements is a type of practical 
argumentation. As such, it is a type of argumentation that considers, as a relevant 
circumstance, the opinion of the counterpart. In such sense, negotiation as practical 
argumentation can be considered second-order persuasion. 
The plan of the paper is the following: in section 2 I will distinguish two types of 
negotiation, the bargaining type and the disagreement management type; in section 3 I 
will specify the first requisite for the shift to negotiation, which is that the disagreement 
must be practical rather than theoretical. In section 4 I will specify the second requisite 
of the shift to negotiation, that is, that the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice. In 
section 4 I will argue that negotiation is a type of practical argumentation. In the 
conclusion I will present some final remarks and questions for future research.  
2. What is a Negotiation? 
There’s two ways to look at negotiation: as bargaining of interests or as a disagreement 
management tool. 
2.1 The bargaining type 
When seen as bargaining, to negotiate is to get the best possible deal at a given 
situation. Along this line Walton characterizes negotiation as “a form of interest-based 
bargaining where the goal is to ‘get the best deal’.” (1989, p. 175, 1990, p. 412). 
Negotiation has also been defined “a means to distribute limited resources between 
competing agents. Negotiation can be used to determine the distribution of those 
resources between the conflicting parties” (Wells & Reed, 2003). Accordingly, 
negotiation is a kind of trade-off of interests, where the parties don’t start from a  
disagreement situation but, rather, from a conflict of interests (Walton & Krabbe, 1995).  
 
1 I prefer to use the term “to overcome” instead of “to resolve” to keep resolution as the outcome of a 
persuasion, rather negotiation. This is coherent with the pragma-dialectic use of the term, where 
resolution implies “that the argumentative discourse has resulted in agreement between the parties 
involved on whether or not the standpoint at issue is acceptable” (van Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 528). 
Under the bargaining view, in a negotiation the truth of the matter is almost irrelevant. 
More than committed to the truth, the parties are committed to their interests.  This 
contrasts with persuasion and inquiry dialogues, where the parties try to prove that 
some proposition is true or false (Walton, 1998). Given the bargaining idea, then, the 
distinction between persuasion and negotiation dialogue is quite clear: in a persuasion 
dialogue the parties provide arguments to convince the counterpart that certain 
statement is true or false; while in a negotiation the parties aim for the fulfillment of 
their own interests.  
2.2. Disagreement management type 
Along with the bargaining view, some authors claim that negotiation can be used to 
overcome differences of opinion (Van Laar & Krabbe, 2018). I will call this type of 
negotiation practical disagreement case. When used as such, negotiation is a 
disagreement management tool, that is, a way to find a rational solution to the problem 
posed by the disagreement. 
In the practical disagreement case, the parties face not only a clash of interest, but also 
a practical disagreement or disagreement regarding a policy or course of action (more 
on this on the following section). As in a persuasion dialogue, in this type of negotiation 
the beliefs of the parties are not fixed, but may change as a dynamic system (Sycara, 
1990). Therefore, the beliefs of the parties and their meta-beliefs (beliefs about their 
counterpart’s beliefs) are at the center of the negotiation. What the parties aim for, 
then, is not only to get the best possible deal, but to change the counterpart’s attitude 
towards certain standpoint. Therefore, in this type of negotiation persuasion is central 
and not secondary, and the boundaries between negotiation and persuasion tend to 
fade (Provis, 2004). This process will be better described in section 5 of this paper. 
The shift to negotiation is a way in which negotiation can be used as a disagreement 
management tool. But in order to do that two requisites need to be met: the 
disagreement must be practical, and the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice or 
compromise. I will explain these requisites in the following sections.  
3. First requisite: practical disagreement 
 
3.1 What is a practical disagreement about? 
Even assuming that negotiation is a disagreement management tool, it is clear enough 
that not every type of disagreement can be shifted from persuasion to negotiation. 
Consider the following cases: 
Example 2: Global Warming 
2.A Laura and Patrick are lawmakers. They disagree over on whether global 
warming is being caused by human activity. 
2.B Laura and Patrick are lawmakers. They disagree over approving or 
rejecting a policy that will tax carbon in order to fight global warming. 
In case 2.A, if the parties want to overcome the disagreement, they must present 
persuasive reasons: there’s no amount of money that Laura can offer to Patrick to 
change his mind. But in case 2.B, besides presenting persuasive reasons the parties can 
negotiate. For instance, Laura could say: “If you approve this bill, I will approve next 
week’s bill on tax cut”.  
Why can negotiation be performed in 2.B but not in 2.A? A first approach would be the 
following: 2.A is a disagreement over a descriptive statement while 2.A is a 
disagreement over an evaluative disagreement. Therefore, disagreement over 
descriptive statements are non-negotiable, while disagreements over evaluative 
statements are negotiable. 
This would be coherent with Sproule (1980) who distinguishes three types of 
statements: facts, interpretations and evaluations. So, while 2.A is an interpretation 
(because it has to do with the causes of a state of affairs); 2.B is an evaluation, because 
the parties evaluate that certain action or policy is “good” or “bad”. 
But this is not fine-grained enough. It appears that some evaluations can be negotiated 
while other cannot. Consider the following example:  
Example 3: Vacation destination 
3.A Ana and Claudia disagree on whether Brazil or New Zealand is a better 
vacation destination. 
3.B Ana and Claudia are going on vacation together, but they disagree about 
going to Brazil or New Zealand. 
In both these cases the parties are making an evaluation: they disagree about the 
goodness of Brazil or New Zealand as a vacation destination. Also, in both cases the 
parties could try to persuade each other by providing persuasive reasons. In fact, the 
reasons could be exactly the same. In 3.A and 3.B Ana could say that Brazil is cheaper 
and has better weather, while Claudia could argue that New Zealand is safer and has 
better infrastructure.  
But only in 3.B the parties can negotiate their way out of the disagreement. Ana could 
say something like: “look, I know you prefer New Zealend but for this year let’s go to 
Brazil. I promise that we will go to New Zealand next year.” Or something like “I will pay 
you the airplane ticket if we go to Brazil”. On the other hand, negotiation wouldn’t be 
possible in 3.A. Even if Ana would offer 100 billion dollars to Claudia to change her mind, 
she shouldn’t be able to do it unless Ana could provide persuasive reasons. So, there 
must be a difference between 3.A. and 3.B. Calling both of them “evaluations” is not 
enough to distinguish practical from theoretical disagreements. 
Steinberg  & Freeley (1986) consider three types of statements: about fact, value and 
policy. So, while 3.A would be an example of a disagreement over a value, 3.B would be 
an example of a disagreement over a policy. A value proposition evaluates the goodness 
of a state of affairs, while a policy tries to answer the question “what should we do about 
it?”. Therefore, the parties can negotiate policies, not evaluations.  
I will call disagreements about facts or value theoretical disagreements, and 
disagreements about policies practical disagreements. But why practical disagreements 
can be shifted to negotiation while theoretical ones cannot? What is it about policy 
propositions that makes them different to facts and value propositions? 
It could be that the type of commitment is different. If disagreement is a clash of 
commitments2, then in cases like 2.A or 3.A the parties are committed to defending the 
truth of a statement, in other words, they are asking: “is P true?”; while in cases like 2.B 
or 3.B they are committed to defending the desirability of a statement, in other words, 
they ask: “should we do P?”. In the same sense, Lumer has argued that practical 
arguments relate to the “desirability of states of affair” (2005, p. 232).  
If we consider that negotiation is a type of trade, then it is clearer why only practical 
disagreements can be traded: We can trade our desires, not our beliefs.  
This is commonsensical. We usually trade our desires. If I have a strong desire to eat 
chocolate cake, it seems possible to trade such a desire. For example, if my partner 
wants me to avoid eating chocolate cake, she could offer me to do the dishes if I restrain 
myself. Of course, my partner could also use persuasive reasons instead, like: “do you 
remember that you wanted to lose wight? Do you know how many calories that cake 
has?” 
On the other hand, beliefs can´t be traded. The only way in which people can change 
her counterpart’s theoretical commitments is through persuasion. We don’t expect that 
people’s beliefs could be traded. That’s why the following joke by the Marx brothers is 
funny: “these are my principles, if you don’t like them, I have others”. 
3.2 The nature of desires 
The fact that a proposition containing desires can be argued persuasively or negotiated 
implies upholding certain view on desires: that desires are “attitudes towards 
propositions” or “have propositional content” (Schroeder, 2017, p. 7). In other words, 
we desire some state of affairs expressed in a proposition. If desires wouldn’t have 
propositional content it would be impossible to use persuasion dialogue to change 
them, since persuasion is always about the truth of a proposition (Walton, 1998) 
Therefore, the difference between practical and theoretical disagreement is the 
following: theoretical disagreements are disagreements regarding a belief on certain 
state of affairs P, while practical disagreements are disagreements regarding the 
desirability of certain state of affairs P.  
Thanks to this distinction we could point out the difference between 3.A and 3.B. In the 
first case the parties merely state that something is better than something else. 
 
2 The fact that the disagreement is about commitments implies a clash regarding only propositions that 
the parties publicly are committed to. It refers to the concept of commitment as Walton and Krabbe 
(1995) use it, which derives from Hamblin (1970). It means that the parties clash regarding propositions 
that they are committed to defend, which does not always coincide with what they believe. 
Therefore, they are referring to the goodness of certain state of affairs, but they are not 
desiring anything regarding that state of affairs3. 
3.3 Requisites of practical disagreement 
However, not every desire would lead the parties to a practical disagreement. Besides 
the parties having desires, in order to disagree practically it is necessary that those 
desires clash with each other. For example, if when ordering at a restaurant, John desires 
chocolate cake and Jane desires ice cream, it is perfectly possible that they both satisfy 
their desires without having to disagree. A disagreement would occur only if the desire 
of one party is incompatible to the desire of the other party.  
But even clashing desires might not lead to practical disagreement if the parties have no 
agency over the desired state of affairs. For example: Juan wants Real Madrid to win at 
the Champion League’s final, and Bob wants Liverpool to win at it. They sit at a bar and 
discuss the upcoming game, expressing their desires. In this case, Juan’s desire is not 
compatible with Bob’s desire and vice-versa. However, we wouldn’t say that this is a 
practical disagreement. There is something lacking; namely, there´s nothing that Juan or 
Bob can do to make their team win: they don’t have agency over that particular state of 
affairs. Therefore, this is not a practical disagreement, not even a theoretical one. The 
parties just past each other: Juan desires something and Bob desires something else. 
But even having a clash of desires and agency over the desired state of affairs, the parties 
might still not be facing a practical disagreement if they are not willing or forced to act 
upon their desire. In that case we are not, yet, in a practical disagreement but in a 
theoretical one. For example, 3.B would be different if the parties, instead of saying: “we 
should go to Brazil” or “we should go to New Zealand” would say “It would be good to 
go to Brazil with you”. In that case the parties are expressing their clashing desires, and 
have agency over it (imagine that they have the time and money to do such a trip) but 
if they haven’t decided to act upon it they are not in a practical disagreement situation. 
In practical disagreements the parties decide to act upon their desired state of affairs, 
voluntarily or forced to do it. In a forced option, as William James (1960) describe it, the 
parties must do something. For example, in 2.B the parties must vote over the new bill, 
they can’t just decide to do nothing about it (staying at home the day of the voting is a 
way of doing something about it by omission). 
In consequence, practical disagreements would occur only if: (1) two or more parties 
have desires over a state of affairs; (2) those desires are clashing with each other; (3) 
the parties have agency over the desired state of affairs, and (4) the parties are willing 
or forced to act upon the desired state of affairs. If (1) or (2) are not met, the parties 
 
3 This does not imply that evaluations are necessarily referred to states of affairs external to the agent 
making the evaluation. That is a big discussion in meta-ethics that is out of the scope of the present paper. 
So, let’s just say: in an evaluation the parties do not desire the state of affairs but merely describe it as 
good or bad, while in a policy proposition the parties desire certain state of affairs. 
might be in a dialogue, but not in a disagreement. If (3) or (4) are not met the parties 
will be in a theoretical rather than in practical disagreement. 
Therefore, a definition of practical disagreement would be the following: a clash of 
commitments between two or more parties regarding a desire over certain state of 
affairs, where the parties have agency over the state of affairs and are willing or forced 
to act upon it.  
3.4. Types of practical disagreement 
Considering the four requisites just given, the field of practical disagreements can be 
better mapped. There are two types of disagreements that can be overcome by 
negotiation: 
(1) A and B hold clashing desires over the allocation of certain scarce goods. 
(2)  And B hold clashing desires over a policy. 
Case (1) is very close to the “bargaining type” of negotiation described by Walton ( 1998) 
or Wells and Reed (2003). For example, if party A wants to buy a car from party B, or if 
two companies are negotiating a construction contract, we are in presence of this kind 
of negotiation. In this kind of disagreement, the parties are committed to their own 
interests, and the truth of the matter (if there is such a thing) is mostly irrelevant. 
Persuasion could still play a role on this kind of disagreement, but it is certainly minor, 
and the parties could successfully negotiate without trying to persuade at all4. In most 
cases we shouldn’t expect that this kind of disagreement can be shifted from or to a 
persuasion dialogue. 
Case (2) refers to the “policy statement” described before. The Merrian-Webster 
dictionary defines policy as: “a definite course or method of action selected from among 
alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future 
decisions”. In this case the parties try to answer the normative question: “what should 
we do?”. The dictionary considers two cases: a “course of action” or a “method of 
action”.  
In a “course of action”, the parties are committed to a joint action but disagree over the 
best way to do it. For example, two doctors performing surgery may disagree over the 
best way to proceed, a couple may disagree over their next vacation destination or the 
managers of a company may disagree about firing an employee.  
The “method of action” implies deciding certain rule for guiding future decisions. In a 
practical disagreement the parties disagree over whether or not imposing that rule. 
Anyhow, a rule could be private (“no TV after 7 PM”) or public (“we will tax carbon 
emissions by 50%”).  
 
4 So, for instance, if I’m trying to sell my car I can use persuasive arguments such as: “look, the car is in 
very good shape, I’ve never had a mechanical problem”; or I can just go to the negotiation phase: “this is 
the price”. 
In a policy proposition there is an intended goal and some means to arrive at that goal. 
The parties might disagree over the intended goal or about the means to arrive at it. So, 
for example, two doctors performing a surgery have the same goal: to save the patient. 
But they might disagree about the best way to do it. On the other hand, two politicians 
might have totally different goals; one of them wants to raise taxes, while the other 
wants to diminish them.   
When Van Laar and Krabbe (2018) analyze the shift to negotiation they are thinking in 
case (2). Therefore, from now on I will reserve the term “practical disagreement” for 
those cases.  
 
4. Second requisite: willingness to trade  
 
4.1 To trade or not to trade 
The fact that a disagreement is practical does not necessarily imply that it makes sense 
to make a shift to negotiation. Consider the following case: 
Example 4.A: Emergency room 
Philip and Rose are doctors who are performing a very complicated surgery 
when the patient starts having complications. Then the following dialogue 
ensues: 
(1) Philip: we are losing him! We should give him 100 millimeters of drug A. 
(2) Rose: I disagree! Drug B would work better. 
 
In this case we wouldn’t consider reasonable a shift to negotiation. For example, if Phillip 
says: “look, if we give him drug X I will buy you lunch” or “let’s give him half dose of both 
drugs” we would consider that move improper. But what makes it odd to shift the 
dialogue to negotiation in this case? Compare that case with the following: 
Example 4.B: Movie night 
Susan and Emily are going to the movies. However, they disagree on which 
movie to watch. After giving persuasive arguments to support their choice, 
they shift the dialogue to a negotiation: 
(1) Susan: Look, I really don’t want to watch movie A. Let’s do something, I 
will invite you to some drinks afterwards if we watch movie B. 
(2) Emily: Ok, that’s an offer I can`t refuse. 
 
In this case, the shift to negotiation seems completely adequate. Then, what is the 
difference between 4.A and 4.B? Let’s say, first, what they have in common: in both 
cases there is a practical disagreement of the joint action type described before. 
Therefore, in both cases the parties hold clashing commitment regarding their desires 
over the best course of action. 
The difference seems to be in one element: the importance of the truth of the matter. I 
agree with Lumer (2005, p. 233) in considering that practical disagreements have an 
epistemic value and, therefore, can be reconstructed in terms of truth and knowledge. 
Natural language seems to back this position. When facing a practical disagreement 
people will usually say things like: “you don’t know what you are doing” or “it’s not true 
that this is the best option”5. 
Cases 4.A could be reconstructed in these terms. On case 4.A. there is a moral 
imperative: to save the life of the patient. Taking the best course of action to save the 
life of the patient (whether that’s drug A, drug B, or something else) seems to be the 
correct answer. Therefore, it would be appropriate for one of the parties to say: “I know 
that drug A will save his life, I read a paper about it” or “it is true that drug A will save 
his life”. 
Case 4.B can also be reconstrued in these terms. If Susan prefers move A and Emily 
prefers movie B, then there must be a correct true course of action where the overall 
likeness is maximized, and the overall dislike is minimized. For instance, it might be that, 
other conditions being equal, the dislike of Susan for movie B is bigger than the dislike 
of Emily for movie A. Therefore, movie A should be the best option and Susan could say: 
I know that you will love movie A. 
So, the difference between cases 4.A and 4.B seems to be the following: in both cases 
the truth of the matter is relevant, but in case 4.A, the truth of the matter is way more 
important: the life of a patient is at stake. So, while in case 4.A the parties should try to 
overcome the issue by persuasive means, in case 4.B a negotiation is a reasonable 
solution. The shift to negotiation must be evaluated by the parties considering, 
especially, their social and epistemic goal. 
4.2 Two goals of argumentation 
Jacobs (2003) considers that argumentation serves two main functions: a cognitive or 
epistemic function and a social function. The cognitive or epistemic function implies an 
individual effort for belief management. Therefore, it has to do with arriving as close as 
possible to the truth of the matter.  If we define argumentation solely by that function, 
we should say that argumentation is “a social quest for true belief and error avoidance” 
(Goldman, 1994, p. 28) . But that’s not the only function of argumentation. The social 
function implies a quest for disagreement management. It has to do with arriving at an 
agreement, even if that implies sacrificing, to some extent, the epistemic goal. 
When faced with practical disagreements the parties need to consider what they value 
the most. If they value their epistemic goal, then negotiation is not advised: they should 
keep providing persuasive arguments, aiming for the best outcome. But if they value the 
social goal more, they might be willing to make a sacrifice: give up their epistemic goal 
 
5 Rather than “theoretical knowledge” what the parties have is “practical knowledge”. Which has been 
defined as “the knowledge that is inherent in the experience of bringing something to fruition. The reality 
it ‘knows’ is available by and through the agent's ‘doing’ as it pertains to the active pursuit of that value 
or project.” (Wilks Keefer, 1996, p. 40) 
to secure the social goal. In other words, the parties need to choose between truth and 
agreement. If they pick truth, they will try to keep persuading each other or look for 
other argumentative or non-argumentative settlement methods6. If they pick 
agreement, they will give up part of their epistemic goal (therefore, part of their desires) 
to look for an agreement. Of course, the value that the parties give to each goal will vary 
in every case, but in some situations, like the examples presented before, we can expect 
that most people will react in a predictable way.  
Sometimes, things are complicated. When discussing policy propositions some parties 
will give more value to their cognitive goal, while other will settle for a negotiation. We 
can call the first group ideologic (“these are my principles, I will not change my 
position”), and the second group pragmatic (“any agreement is better than nothing at 
all”). Consider the following example (van Laar & Krabbe, 2018): 
Example 5: Greenhouse emissions 
Party A and Party B disagree about the level of renewable energy that should 
be used by 2020. Party A proposes a 18% and party B a 14%. After trying to 
persuade each other providing several reasons they arrive at a stalemate:  no 
party has been able to persuade the other. Therefore, they decide to split the 
difference at 16%7. 
 
In this case the parties have arrived at a stalemate. Insisting on a persuasion dialogue 
seems a bad idea because nobody seems to be persuading the counterpart, and even if 
they do, persuasion might have high costs and dangers (Paglieri & Castelfranchi, 2010). 
Since both the parties are pragmatic enough, a negotiation is successful. However, we 
need only one ideologic party to make the negotiation fail.  
In the end, what the parties put on the scales are their desires on one side, and the 
chances of persuading, costs and dangers of persuasive argumentation on the other. 
More pragmatic parties will have a scale that leans towards agreement (social goal) and 
will need a very strong case to lean towards truth (like example 4.A). Ideologic parties 
have a scale that leans towards truth, so choosing agreement will only happen if the 
costs or dangers of arguing are too high, or the chances of persuading too low. 
So far, I hope to have shown that negotiation is a sound way for resolving disagreements, 
as long those disagreements are practical, and the parties are willing to make a sacrifice. 
But how does negotiation of this kind works? I will answer this question in the following 
section. 
 
6 Like arbitration, mediation, trial, mere luck or violence. 
7 I recognize two types of negotiation: splitting type and additional offer type. This example is a splitting 
type, and it can be performed as long as the object of disagreement allows splitting. That is not always 
the case. In example 3.B, for instance, the parties can’t watch half movie, but they can still offer 
something else. In the additional offer type, the parties offer something else, which can be related or 
not to the original disagreement, as in example 3.B. 
5. Negotiation as practical argumentation 
I claim that negotiation as a disagreement management tool is a type of practical 
argumentation. To understand this, it is necessary first to clarify what is practical 
reasoning and what is its difference with practical argumentation. Then, I will establish 
in which sense negotiation is a type of practical argumentation. Finally, I will distinguish 
persuasion from negotiation. 
5.1 Practical reasoning and practical argumentation 
Practical reasoning has been defined as  
“a goal-driven, knowledge-based, action- guiding species of reasoning that 
coordinates goals with possible alternative courses of action that are means 
to carry out these goals, in relation to an agent’s given situation as he/she/it 
sees it, and concludes in a proposition that recommends a prudent course 
of action” (Walton, 1997, p. 160). 
To understand Walton’s definition we need to bear in mind that he considers 
“reasoning” to be: “a sequence of steps from some point (premises) to other points 
(conclusions)” (1990, p. 404). Therefore, practical reasoning is a special kind of reasoning 
where someone begins with a given situation and try to move towards certain goals. 
Thagard provides a simple model for practical reasoning: 
“My goals are G1... Gn.  
The possible actions are A1 ... Am.  
Aj is the best means of accomplishing the goals. 
Therefore, I should do Aj” (1984, p. 26). 
 
Under this conception, practical reasoning seems to be a kind of individual and cognitive 
activity. For example, if I’m playing chess I can reason as follows: 
My goal at move 8 is to check the black king. 
The possible actions to check the king are moving the rook or the knight. 
Moving the knight is the best way of accomplishing my goal, because P and Q. 
Therefore, I should move the knight. 
 
This is practical reasoning but not, yet, practical argumentation. I´m not providing any 
argument why it’s a good idea to move the knight, I’m just thinking about it. Practical 
argumentation only appears when I need to argue with someone else over my practical 
reasoning. 
According to Walton an argument is defined as “a social and verbal means of trying to 
resolve, or at least contend with a conflict or difference that has arisen between two 
parties engaged in a dialogue” (1990, p. 411). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst consider 
that “argumentation” is adduced in reaction to, or in anticipation of, a difference of 
opinion, and serves a role in the regulation of disagreement” (2004, p. 53). Therefore, 
practical reasoning will only turn into practical argumentation when a disagreement 
arises, and the parties need to externalize their reasoning8. 
Considering the above picture, practical argumentation and negotiation seem different 
dialogue types. It is one thing to use practical reasons to convince the counterpart of the 
convenience of a policy, and another thing to offer a pragmatic compromise. But is it 
so? If we consider argumentation to be a dynamic process, then persuasion and 
negotiation have very little difference. 
5.2 Negotiation as practical argumentation  
When we argue for a practical goal we can use all sorts of arguments and argumentation 
schemes, even more than in the theoretical case (Craig, 1996). Some arguments refer to 
the object of disagreement, they try to prove that certain course of action is the best for 
achieving certain goal or that certain goal is desirable, without considering the beliefs of 
the counterpart. But other arguments take the counterpart’s beliefs, the dialogical 
situation and the disagreement space in consideration, and argue considering what is 
feasible given these circumstances. When this happens the practical argumentation 
process can move from a persuasion to a negotiation dialogue. 
We can look at this problem from the standpoint of desires. As stated in section 2, 
practical disagreements refer to a clash of desires. The clash could be about the goal of 
the parties, or about the means to arrive at that goal. Therefore, two parties can 
disagree about whether or not to go to Paris, or about going by train or plane. In any 
case, once they have shared their desires (or in anticipation of its sharing), they might 
realize that persuasion is not possible or too costly. Therefore, they might choose to 
negotiate. 
But what happens to their original desire during the negotiation phase? It is still there, 
but it has been affected by another desire. In the literature of desires this phenomenon 
has been labeled as second-order desires (Frankfurt, 1998). Second-order desires are 
desires about first order desires, which are the things that we desire in first place. 
Accordingly, if Ana desires to go to Brazil and Claudia to New Zealand, that is their first-
order desire. But, since they realize that they disagree, Ana might have a second-order 
desire that overrules the first and allow the parties to agree on something. For instance, 
it could be that Ana desires strongly to go on vacation with Claudia, so this higher-order 
desire, along with the realization that she will not persuade her counterpart, allows her 
to be open for a negotiation9. In a negotiation the first order desire will, typically, refer 
to the epistemic goal, while the second-order desire will refer to the social goal. In other 
words: one of the parties desires P to be the case, but also desires an agreement. The 
desire for an agreement might overrule the desire for P, modifying P to P’. 
 
8 This does not imply that argumentation without disagreement cannot occur, as some authors have 
pointed out (Blair, 2012; Doury, 2012; Micheli, 2012). 
9 In example 3.A “Emergency room” both parties desire to save the patient’s life. Therefore, it is hard to 
find a higher order desire capable of overruling the first one. 
This dynamic process will affect the parties at the level of their reasons. Then, they will 
have prior reasons (before knowing the counterpart’s opinion) and posterior reasons 
that they have adjusted considering the social situation10. 
Negotiation, then, is a type of practical argumentation were the parties adjust their 
goals or their means-goal relationship, in accordance with the social situation (or the 
social goal, in Jacobs’s terms). Lewinski’s (2017) scheme of practical argumentation will 
we useful to clarify the dynamics of the process. 
Figure 1, The scheme of practical argumentation 
 
(Lewiński, 2017, p. 90) 
 
10 In this sense, the situation is analogous to the concept of higher-order evidence, which is evidence 
about the first order evidence (Kelly, 2010). 
In this scheme the parties have certain goals (G) that arise from their values (V). 
Analyzing the circumstances (C) they propose a course of action (M) that may take the 
situation from C to G. This course of action can have three levels: M is the best, 
satisfactory, or good enough. This scheme is static, but once it becomes dynamic it can 
be used to understand negotiation. 
Let’s take example 5, “greenhouse emissions”, to clarify this. In the example, there are 
two different moments, t0 and t1. The first is the persuasion dialogue phase, the second 
is the negotiation phase.  
At t0 Party A proposes that 18% of energy should be produced by renewable sources. At 
this stage, then, their scheme could be reconstructed as: 
V: We are committed to the avoidance of global warming. 
G: We want to reduce the amount of C02 emitted by our country. 
C: Global warming is happening, our country has signed the Paris agreement, 
we are in a good economic position, technologies allow energy transition, 
etc. 
M-G: We need to produce as much energy as possible by renewable sources. 
An 18% of renewable sources is the best course of action. 
Conclusion: We should produce 18% of our energy by renewable sources. 
 
Party B also produces an analogous scheme, that argues that a 14% of renewable energy 
is all that the country can afford. The difference arises from the fact that, probably, party 
B has different values (for instance, they say: we are committed to provide cheap energy 
for the people). 
But when they both share their arguments something changes. Both parties realize that 
they are not going to persuade their counterpart, and that, therefore, their proposal is 
not feasible. Accordingly, at t1, party A adds a new circumstance in the circumstances 
box:  
C: party B is not convinced by our proposal at t0.  
This new circumstance affects the whole process. Now, they have a higher-order desire 
(to arrive at an agreement) affecting their first-order desire. Therefore, they need to 
change something. For social, more than epistemic reasons, they settle and change the 
M-G box from “best” to “satisfactory”, changing the number11: 
M-G: We need to produce as much energy as possible by renewable sources. A 16% of 
renewable sources is good enough. 
 
Party B also modifies their scheme in a similar way. Therefore, they both agree on a 
solution. 
 
11 A bigger change would imply changing their goal. However probably in this case they are ideologic 
regarding their goal. 
The shift to negotiation could be, then, be seen as a change in the dialogue type. But we 
could also think of it as a dynamic and collaborative persuasion dialogue: at t0, party A 
has persuaded party B that 16% is a good figure for both of them. The process can, 
therefore, be called meta-persuasion. 
5.3 Negotiation and persuasion 
What is exactly the relationship between persuasion and negotiation? I’ve claimed that 
the distinction is blurry, at least for the disagreement management type but, how 
exactly? Can we still say that there’s one thing called persuasion and another 
argumentation? 
For Van Laar and Krabbe (2018) in a negotiation process there is a number of second-
order disagreements that might be resolved trough persuasion. For example, a second-
order disagreement has to do with the method for dealing with the irresolvable first 
order issue when it appears. If the parties agree on a compromise, that is a kind of 
second-order resolution that facilitates dealing with the first-order issue. 
This position seems correct in considering that in a negotiation there are second-order 
disagreements, but it’s a little bit too artificial. What parties facing a practical 
disagreement usually do is aim for the best option, providing reasons why their option 
should be preferred. When they find that the disagreement in unresolvable or that 
persuasive argumentation is too costly or dangerous, they present a solution that is 
good enough, providing persuasive reasons for it. If the disagreement is still 
unresolvable, they might present a necessary solution12. If after that, there is still no 
agreement, they might change their initial position and start all over again13. 
Ultimately, then, negotiation as practical argumentation is a sort of meta- persuasion. 
So, what is the difference between persuasion and negotiation dialogue regarding 
practical disagreements? 
In a persuasion dialogue, the parties take only into consideration only first-order 
reasons. That is, reasons why P is a good policy, without considering or anticipating the 
opinion of the counterpart. In a negotiation dialogue, the parties do take into account 
the opinion of the counterpart, plus the costs and dangers of argumentation. Therefore, 
their persuasive argument aims not at the best option, but at an option that is at least 
good enough. They are trading truth for agreement. 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to show that the shift to negotiation is a useful way for 
overcoming disagreements. To do that I wanted to show, first, the requisites of the shift 
to negotiation to, then, show that the disagreement management type of negotiation is 
a form of practical argumentation. 
 
12 The categories of best, good enough and necessary are taken from Lewiński (2017). 
13 Remember that many practical disagreements are forced options, so suspending judgement is not an 
option. 
The novelty of the paper was to flesh out the circumstances in which that shift might 
occur, and the dynamics that it could take. My ultimate goal is to understand the 
dynamics of disagreements, and how disagreements can be overcome by rational 
means. In such sense, exploring the possibilities of negotiation can present it under a 
new light, that allows us to think of it as a type of argumentation that is advantageous 
in practical settings. 
Many questions remain unanswered, however. Among them are the normative 
requirements of this type of negotiation. When can we say that the parties have acted 
irrationally? If this type of negotiation is just a type of practical argumentation, what is 
fallacious for them? Also, a deeper approach to negotiation as a disagreement 
management tool would require the reconstruction of actual negotiation dialogues, to 
see how they fit with this model. Finally, it would be interesting to understand the 
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